To do so would be
suicidal, for no standard rate of wages could stand against the pressure
of an increased supply of labour upon a fixed demand. But it is not
necessary to suppose that any considerable number of actually qualified
workmen are refused admission to Trade Unions of skilled workers. For
the possession of the requisite skill, implying as it does a certain
natural capacity, and an expenditure of time and money not within the
power of the poorest classes, forms a practical limit to the number of
applicants. Moreover, in many trades, though by no means in all,
restrictions are placed by the Unions upon the number of apprentices,
with the object of limiting the number of those who should from year to
year be qualified to compete for work. In other trades where no rigid
rule to this effect exists, there is an understanding which is equally
effective. Certain trades, such as the engineers, boiler-makers, and
other branches of iron trade, place no restrictions, and in certain
other trades the restrictions are not closely applied. But most of the
strong Trades Unions protect themselves in another way against the
competition of unemployed. By a System of "out of work" pay, they bribe
those of their body, who from time to time are thrown out of work, not
to underbid those in work, so as to bring down the rate of wages.
Several of the most important Unions pay large sums every year to "out
of work" members. By these three means, the "minimum wage" qualification
for membership, the limitation of the number of apprentices, and the
"out of work" fund, the Trade Unions strengthen the power of organized
labour in skilled industries by restricting the competition of
unemployed outsiders.
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