While France offered
us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years
enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.
[Sidenote: Plans for construction on a vast scale.]
With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making
plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover,
broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would
bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the
nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for
material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three
and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of
shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a
correspondingly large project for additional railways and for storage
depots.
[Sidenote: The southern ports are selected.]
All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we
were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the
war we must utilise the southern ports of France--Bordeaux, La Pallice,
St. Nazaire, and Brest--and the comparatively unused railway systems
leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would
contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that
direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located,
preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so
that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they
might be serving on the western front.
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