In the artillery school, at Saumur, young
officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery;
while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in
aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered
curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were
coordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing
and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the
rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General Petain
placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and
we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their
veteran experience.
[Sidenote: Questions of communication and supply.]
The eventual place the American Army should take on the western front
was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication
and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British
Armies' shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise
at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and
these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system
behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us
as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of
northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new
construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots and regulating
stations must be provided by fresh constructions.
Pages:
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294